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Interim Report on Management Staff Survey of the Security Office

#### 1. PURPOSE:

This survey is being undertaken to review the organisation and staffing of the Security Office. The interim report represents the first phase of the survey, an analysis of the overall organizational pattern.

- 2. RELATED PACTS:
- a. The Security office has as its mission the preparation and execution of the Agency's security program, including the following major functions:
  - (1) Security policies, procedures, research and counter-intelligence.
  - (2) Physical security.
  - (3) Security determination as to personnel for employment, assignment, er association with the Ajency and for certain activities pertaining
  - (h) Operational support for Agency projects and special inquiry service for the Agency.
  - (5) Security investigations.
  - (6) Security inspection.
- b. The present erganisation as shown by the chart in and the description of staffs and divisions do not, in major operating elements, clearly indicate the functions performed.
- 3. DISCUSSION:
- a. The present organization consists of four staffs and three divisions.

  The major operating elements of the office are the Security Division and the Special Security Division.
- b. In general, it is intended that the SD handle overt and semi-covert cases and that SSD have the covert cases. The objective of this division of labor is that all covert cases be handled separately and spart from overt and semi-covert cases. In actual accomplishment this is not attained at

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under the jurisdiction of the CSE and therefore, with respect to personnel, all cases flow through the SSE. The separation of covert cases from other cases is attained at the Section level in SSE, there being in that Division an Open Section handling overt and semi-covert cases and Covert Security Clearance and Operational Clearance Peaks (or sections) handling covert cases. With respect to records, there is a clear separation, each division maintaining its own records. There is one other area where all cases are handled and this is the Interrogation Research Branch (polygraph) of SSE. Obviously, some aspects of all personnel cases are handled both in SD and in SSD.

- e. Certain procedures are necessarily duplicated in SD and SSD. These are:

  (1) the review of requests for clearance and establishment of requirements essential to evaluating the case and (2) appraisal of the results of the investigation. In SD requirement and appraisal are accomplished by the Requirements Section and the Appraisal Section and in SSD both phases are accomplished by the Covert Security Clearance Bask for covert personnel and by the Operational Clearance Bask for and and miscellaneous personnel to be used operationally shroad. The new for limiting knowledge of covert personnel to the minimum number of people justifies what might be regarded as duplication of procedures and it is probable that the workload justifies the existence of similar procedures in these Sections.
- d. The above discussion of SD and SSI has largely related to personnel clearances and investigations and these represent the principal functions of the Divisions. In addition, there is found in SD a major activity in the Physical Security Branch, a Records Section, and a Research Section, which meistains indices of organisations and persons known or suspected of affiliation or association with organizations suspected of Communist leanings. The SSP has, in addition to its investigative work and personnel clearances (covert), a Project Tesk which handles clearances on a project basis and agency Projects which involve not only clearances but related operational security support, and an operational Support and Special Inquiry Tesk which handles Agency Projects not requiring personnel clearances. There is also a Correspondent less but this is setually a part of the invertigative operation. Accordingly, there are in these two Divisions all or parts of four major functions of the Office, namely, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Operational Support and Security Investigations.
- e. The Inspection Division has responsibility for security inspections of all foreign and demestic Agency installations, non-Agency training facilities, and centracts. These functions, which represent the major functions of the Division are those usually designated as Staff activity. In addition, under the general heading of "Operational Support", this

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Division has responsibility for furnishing security guidance and coordinating foreign and domestic recurity Officers (those assigned to operating elements of the Agency and not on the T/O of the SO), menitoring visitors and assignments of fereign matienals within Agency buildings, menitoring training courses, and for reviewing and approving domestic shipments of explosives.

One is Counter-Intelligence and the other is Technical Research. The research activity is largely related to measures, methods, and equipment for use as aids in the practice of counter measures. Therefore, the two activities have as a common objective the prevention of Agency penetration by foreign intelligence organizations. It receives and analyses information from other elements of 50 which might be indicative of possible penetration or an attempt to penetrate. Each Staff and Division of 50 has a responsibility for informing the Security Research Staff of matters, occurrences, or developments having Counter-Intelligence implications. The Counter-Intelligence effort is in the nature of a 25%1A timping research project.

- h. The Security Control Staff has as the balk of its work the security aspects of outside activities of Agendy employees such as speeches, written material, travel abroad and other outside employee activities. The Staff promulgate collection and dissemination policies and renders interpretations, opinions and decisions with respect to these policies. It also handles the security aspects of official information releases, limited with other Agencies in connection with Agency projects in such Agencies, reviews for security classified material proposed for dissemination to fereign governments, and serves as security consultant to Agency operating personnel in connection with inter-departmental exploitation, research, and joint efforts. The work of the Security Control Staff with respect to employee activities is not considered to be in the nature of staff activity since it is neither advisory to the Director of Security nor is it in support of the Security Office operating elements. Policy matters now handled by this Staff are such as might well be handled from the Office of the Director of Security
- i. The Administration and Training Staff has those responsibilities usual to such a staff and requires no discussion except to acknowledge the fact that its training responsibility is considerably greater than many other similar elements where the training work is principally that of lisison with the Office of Training.

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### L. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The basic functions of the Security Office mission are (1) Personnel Security, (2) Physical Security, (3) Operational Support and (4) Security Investigations.

It is recognised that Operational Support and Security Investigations are closely related and possibly should be combined and considered as one major function.

Staff functions in support of these Security Office operating functions would be Research, Administration and Training, and Inspection.

The advantages of using these basic functions as an organizational pattern are, more clearly defined areas of responsibility, direct control by the Director of Security of each major function (for example, Physical Security), elimination of direct reporting to the Director of Security of those functions such as employee activities aspects of Security Control which are actually parts of major functions (Operational Support in the case of Personnel Security 25% the case of Security Control), and designation of organizational elements by names indicative of the responsibilities assigned to them. Names such as Security Division and Special Security Division are obviously without meaning unless explained.

Accordingly, it is concluded that the above listed advantages could be gained by adopting an organizational pattern based on the major functions as outlined above.

- b. As brought out in the discussion, the segregation of covert handling is accomplished at the branch and section level in the present organization. For Personnel Security matters covert segregation would be maintained at the same levels and would be controlled through the same number of exhelens as at present. It is therefore concluded that the security of covert personnel and operational support will be adequately maintained in an organization based on the major functions of the SC mission.
- c. It is concluded that the survey should continue with a view to establishing an organizational pattern along the general lines discussed above and as illustrated in the attached functional chart. Detailed study of procedures, working relationships, and the nature and extent of operational support is required before firm proposals can be made with respect to combining all personnel clearance work in one Fivision and determining whether operational support should be a separate Division or combined with Investigations to form a "Security Support Division". (It should be noted that the attached chart is primarily intended as a functional chart and therefore the Executive Officer is not included as a separate block but should be considered as included in the block for the lirector of Security.)

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### 5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Specific recommendations are not being made at this point of the survey. The purpose of this interim report is primarily to show the type of orgamination indicated by analysis of major functions. It is suggested that the conclusions reached be considered with a view to accepting them as the basis for the succeeding phases of the survey.

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Functional Chart

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